Video testimonials work – check these three

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Last week we showcased the village video we produced for Wivenhoe village on the outskirts of Sydney, a five minute video valued at $4,500. Whilst there we filmed three powerful testimonials. Each is three minutes length and produced for $750 per video, giving Wivenhoe four compelling videos for their website and to be featured on for $6,750. Click HERE, HERE and HERE and email me who want more information at

We still have not been paid the $55,000 that Sakkara owe us for the original CTTT case. They said they have not paid as they were appealing. I wonder what the excuse will be now. They also owe us $17,000 for the aborted District Court case, and now we can claim again for the Supreme Court. I hate to think how much Arthur and the barrister Michael Galvin cost them. I wonder if they might give up now!!!!

(Sakkara or the applicant) seeks leave pursuant to rule 59.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (UCPR) to extend the time period in which proceedings for judicial review are to be commenced to the date that the summons was filed by the applicant, being 20 December 2013. The applicant also seeks leave to amend that summons to correct what are described as typographic errors, and costs.

6Sakkara filed an application on 3 June 2011 (RV11/29123) and sought an order under section 108 of the Retirement Villages Act 1999 regarding consent to a variation of the current charges stated in the proposed annual budget for the financial year ending 2012, and an order under section 115 to pay expenditure as stated in that proposed budget. Another application was filed on 15 June 2012 (RV12/32770) in relation to the budget for the year ending 2013, regarding expenditure, variation of recurrent charges and the distribution or otherwise of a Capital Works Fund.
7The residents filed an application on 1 March 2012 (RV12/12787) seeking the appointment of an assessor to make a report to the CTTT, and multiple orders under the Retirement Villages Act 1999.
8Although some consent orders were entered into regarding building rectification work, there remained a number of matters in dispute and the three applications were ultimately heard together on 26, 27 and 28 November 2012. Senior Member Bordon, who heard the applications, handed down the reasons for his decision on 19 April 2013.
9Orders were made, purportedly to reflect the decision of Senior Member Bordon, on 14 June 2013.
10On 12 July 2013, a summons commencing an appeal was filed by Sakkara in the District Court
35In my mind, any application must be brought promptly, and in circumstances where there is a non-existent or unsatisfactory explanation as to the reasons for a delay, any delay in seeking relief is a potent factor in the exercise of a discretion to extend time or otherwise.

42The residents respond that the Court should have regard to prejudice suffered by them namely it should take into account the context of the respondent as a small group of elderly volunteers who face not only age and health challenges but also an imbalance of resources between themselves and the applicant. In my view, these factors are relevant in the exercise of my discretion.

44The passage referred in Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd [1987] AC 189 at 220,
But justice cannot always be measured in terms of money and in my view a judge is entitled to weigh in the balance the strain the litigation imposes on litigants, particularly if they are personal litigants rather than business corporations, the anxieties occasioned by facing new issues, the raising of false hopes, and the legitimate expectation that the trial will determine the issues one way or the other.
45There is a public interest in proceedings such as these being determined informally and expeditiously, as reflected in the objectives of the CTTT Act. Given those objectives, any challenge of whatever kind but certainly one seeking judicial review must be brought promptly. There is no doubt that the applicant seeks to place itself in the most desirable strategic position forensically as it now sees it. If parties belatedly regard the District Court as an inappropriate venue to gain the remedies they seek, that is a matter for them. The applicant wants to shift the venue to this Court, with it seems similar arguments and challenges to certain orders made, but with arguably a wider scope of arguments and remedies. It seems to me that the applicant’s “flip-flopping” should be brought to an end. I say that for a number of reasons.

46First, I do not regard the explanation for the delay as adequate if non-existent. One can reasonably draw the inference that the applicant on advice thought its interests were initially best served by commencing in the District Court. The discontinuance in the District Court, I infer, was implemented by reason of a change in strategy and a fresh assessment of prospects of success.
47Secondly, at an impressionistic level, to have debates years later regarding the appropriateness of budgets as opposed to actual expenditure would appear to me to lack utility.
52Sakkara did not seek to avail itself of the clear invitation to return to the CTTT if problems arose.

57I consider, in addition, that the applicant adopted what may be described as a somewhat relaxed view in relation to the formal motion seeking an extension of time against the backdrop of the history of the litigation.
58In all the circumstances, I do not think I should exercise my discretion to extend the time under rule 59.10(2).